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When a group of businessmen in New York asked Prime Minister Nehru about 
the Indian government's policy towards foreign investment, he is reported to have 
looked out of the window and commented on the weather.  Similar is the reaction 
of most influential writers and commentators to the issue of the inclusion of FDI 
on the agenda of the WTO. This is most unfortunate. Not so much because it is 
FDI and the multinational enterprise which are the targets of attack from the 
opponents of globalisation on the streets of Seattle and London, but because FDI 
is intimately intertwined with trade, especially so with international commercial 
transactions in services, and so too with trade related investment measures 
(TRIMS) and trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPS), all of which are 
now on the WTO agenda.  Why then the reluctance to admit that FDI belongs in 
the WTO and that there is a case for framing a cohesive set of multilateral rules 
on FDI?  One explanation is that FDI is doing well, meaning that the volume of 
FDI has increased steadily over the years, and that which is not broke should not 
be fixed. The other explanation is that FDI involves issues of sovereignty, a 
sacred turf best left untouched.  This paper argues that none of this makes 
sense. In the absence of a cohesive set of rules on FDI, liberalisation of trade 
with which it is intimately involved will be impeded. And the reluctance of the 
WTO to discuss and debate FDI, much of which is scattered through out its 
agenda, will only fuel the flames of opposition to globalisation. Such  reluctance 
will be equated with culpability of the WTO of all the supposed sins of 
globalisation. This paper examines the principal reasons for the reluctance to 
include FDI on the agenda of the WTO and makes a case for its inclusion. 
 II Is FDI doing Well? The belief that FDI is doing well is based on the observed growth in foreign 
investment flows in recent years.  Inflows of FDI amounted to $865 billion in the 
year 1999 and the total stock was a sizeable $5 trillion.  Save for the year 1996 
annual average growth rates of FDI flows were in excess of 20 per cent reaching 
39 per cent in the year 1998. Indeed, the volume of production of goods and 
services on account of FDI exceeds that supplied by international trade. Global 
sales and gross product associated with international  production have increased 
faster the  global exports and GDP -by 3.2 per cent and 4.1 per cent , 
respectively, during the period 1982-99 ( UN 2000). And much of international 
trade, around 50 per cent, is on account of intra- trade between affiliates of 
MNEs.  
     Judged by the volume of foreign investment crossing the borders, and its 
relatively high growth rate, FDI is indeed doing well.  But it is this sort of 
judgement that provokes hostility and opposition to FDI. It is doing well by the 
MNEs, but what has it achieved for the host developing countries? The problem 
is that most discussion of FDI is centred on its volume, the factors which propel 
these flows, and ways and means of removing obstacles to its continued growth.  
The  OECD inspired draft on a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) is a 
case in point. There were a number of reasons for its demise including the vast 
range of topics it attempted to cover( Henderson, 1999). It was , however, the 
widespread perception that the sole concern of the MAI was with the 
liberalisation and  growth of FDI that was mainly responsible for its demise. 
 
    Admittedly, FDI is a potent ingredient in the development process, it is an 
acknowledged conduit for the transfer of technology and human skills, it is a 
purveyor of new ideas and it is a source of capital. The policy makers in most 
developing countries are not unaware of the contribution of FDI to the 
development process.  Indeed, most developing countries, for a variety of 
reasons including the  decline in bank credit and aid flows, have eagerly sought 
FDI.  Whist they may not have embraced FDI with open arms, most of them now  
accept it as a necessary evil, more so with the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the demonstrated success of the East Asian countries with FDI.  Even so, the 
OECD draft multilateral agreement, which intentionally or otherwise appeared to 
take the virtues of FDI as the holy writ and preached it to the developing 
countries, was bound to come unstuck.  
      FDI is not a panacea for the development problem.  It functions efficiently and 
contributes to the social product given certain pre conditions. These include a 
stable macro economic environment including price and exchange rate stability, 
presence of distortion free product and labour markets,  and the availability of a 
threshold level of human capital and infrastructure facilities. It is now an 
established fact that FDI is much more effective in promoting growth and 
technical change in economies open to competition from both external and 
internal markets. (Balasubramanyam, Sapsford and Salisu, 1996)  Further, 
growth rates of economies pursuing a neutral development strategy, those which 
do not provide artificial incentives for either the domestic or the export markets, 
appear to converge to the growth rates of developed countries, whist growth 
rates of economies pursuing import substitution strategies appear to show no 
such convergence. And such  convergence is promoted by the efficient utilisation 
of FDI in the countries pursuing a neutral strategy (Silverstraidou and 
Balasubramanyam ,2000 ). In sum, FDI is a superb catalyst of development, but 
not its prime mover. It functions most effectively as a catalyst only in the 
presence of the right sort of ingredients in sufficient volumes. Very few 
developing countries, however, are able to provide all these ingredients. It is for 
this reason that around three quarters of FDI flows to developing countries, out of 
a total of around $180 billion or so per annum in recent years,  is concentrated in 
around a dozen countries. And these are countries that accommodate FDI with 
the sort of an investment environment it requires.  It is thus that claims such as 
FDI is doing well sends mixed messages. It is doing well, judged by the growth in 
its volume, and it is doing well in developing countries which are well placed to 
provide the sort of environment it demands. It is also doing well in certain 
countries, which provide an array of artificial and transient incentives such as tax 
concessions and subsidies of various sorts. In these countries it is doing well in the sense that private rates of return to investment are relatively high. But its 
contribution to the social product is at best marginal and at worst negative. It is 
true to say that FDI responds to market forces, but if the markets are distorted its 
response is not the sort which would augment the development objectives of the 
recipient countries. 
  
 Should we then rest content in the knowledge that FDI is a rich country good as 
it were, and it is of little significance for the very many developing countries which 
either receive insignificant amounts of FDI, or from the social point of view, 
squander what little they receive? The do nothing philosophy suggests as much.  
More to the point, would a multilateral agreement on investment under the aegis 
of the WTO facilitate the utilisation of FDI in the promotion of development 
objectives of the developing countries, especially of those that now receive 
relatively low volumes of FDI? This can be dismissed as a tall order. Even so, a 
framework of rules which removes or delimits various sorts of distortions in 
product and factor markets, and improves the investment climate in general, 
should go a long way in promoting the efficacy of FDI.  It should also provide the 
least developed countries with an opportunity to compete for increased FDI 
flows.     
 
  It could though be argued that development of poor countries is not the 
mandate of the WTO, strictly speaking not even the liberalisation of trade and 
investment, only the promotion of rules based trade.  Surely this would be 
defeatist.  Promotion of rules based trade or multilateralism is a means to an end, 
the end being development of the signatories, especially that of the poor 
countries.  Whatever be the legal nuances and interpretations of the mandate of 
the WTO, the pursuit of liberal trade polices or multilateralism is not just an end in 
itself. And there is a voluminous literature, which attests to the benign impact of 
liberal trade policies on development (Greenaway and Sapsford, 1994 ). 
Advocacy of a compact on FDI  should not be grounded or seen to be grounded 
in the objective of paving the way for unrestrained FDI flows. An agreement on FDI has to take on board the issue of the impact of FDI on development  and not 
just ways and means of augmenting the volume of FDI that crosses the borders.  
 
III The Sovereignty Issue 
      
Any sort of commercial transactions between two or more distinct jurisdictions 
give raise to issues of sovereignty, broadly defined as the legitimate right of one 
jurisdiction to protect its citizens against the encroachment from that of the 
others. The colourful controversies on free trade during the 19 century and the 
debates on imperial preference during the early part of the 20-century involved 
issues of sovereignty. Admittedly, issues relating to the protection of indigenously 
owned factors of production against competition from foreign owned factors of 
production are much starker, principally because of  the presence and 
establishment of foreign owned factors of production within the borders of the 
host country. In the case of FDI, foreign firms are intimately involved in the 
operations of the local economy, unlike in the case of trade and licensing 
agreements. And when the scale and size of operations of the foreign entity and 
its endowments of money and skills are relatively large, as in the case of the 
multinational enterprise, its involvement in the local economy is marked, and 
perceptions concerning its threat to political and economic sovereignty of nation 
states are heightened.  Such fears were routinely expressed during the decades 
of the sixties and the seventies when both the advocacy and opposition to FDI 
ranged to extremes.  These debates though were not entirely vacuous. They 
resulted in a substantial body of academic research  which served to identify the 
costs and benefits of FDI and sift the emotion-ridden arguments from those 
based on facts. These studies also served to allay the fears of developing 
countries at a time when they were compelled to turn to FDI, for reasons stated 
earlier, for their requirements of capital, technology and know-how.  
  
 The old debates though have resurfaced in recent years in the context of 
globalisation, with multinationals and FDI being the target of attack from the anti-globalisation brigade. These are not confined to the slogan mongering protesters 
against globalisation, academics too have pitched in. Alas, there is nothing new 
in the arguments produced, they are just old wine in old bottles. The familiar 
refrain is that multinationals are big, their sales exceed the GDP of some of the 
African countries, there are no trickle down effects from FDI, multinationals pay 
abysmally low wages , and  the freedom of policy makers in developing countries 
is increasingly constrained  by the need to cater for the interests of big business ( 
Hertz, 2000). The riposte to these arguments from the pro-globalisation lobby is 
equally familiar.  The relevant statistic to assess the size of multinationals relative 
to that of the countries in which they operate is not their global sales, but their 
value added, multinationals pay higher wages than comparable locally owned 
firms in developing countries, and  it is  the electorate, not the multinationals, 
which dictate tax and expenditure policies of nation states ( Wolf, 2001).   Both 
camps can produce facts and figures in support of their contentions. 
     These academic jousts do little to progress the debate. There is though ample 
scope to do so, given that  even the most caustic critics of FDI  concede the 
potential of FDI to promote development objectives, broadly defined to include 
transfer of technology and skills and creation of employment opportunities with 
adequate remuneration.  The dispute relates to  the reasons for the failure of FDI 
to deliver much more than what it has done.  Noorena  Hertz  of Cambridge 
University, a critic of globalisation,  sums up the issue  when she writes  
                       " the point is not that inward investment cannot make people of 
recipient countries better off. It is why  there is not a bigger 'trickle down effect'.  
Why is globalisation- to quote James Wolfensohn, head of the World Bank- ' not 
working at the level of the people?"  Why has the number of people living on less 
than $1 a day increased  in every developing country outside East Asia " 
       Hertz's answer to the question she poses is that the political process, 
captured by the big corporations, is unable to protect the interests of the public 
realm.  This may be so, but is it because the politicians and policy makers are 
captured by the big corporations?  Or is it because the political process in most 
developing countries is flawed for reasons which have nothing to do with the multinationals? How come, on Hertz's own admission, the East Asian countries 
are able to reduce levels of poverty and prosper, whilst the others are not able to 
do so? It may be a bit far fetched to argue that democracy thrives in most of the 
East Asian countries and hence their acknowledged success in combating 
poverty and promoting development goals.  The fact of the matter is that policy 
makers in these countries have instituted the sort of policies, which not only 
attract sufficient volumes of FDI but also promote its efficient utilisation.  The 
benefits of FDI can hardly trickle down if countries are unable to attract sufficient 
volumes of FDI in the first place, and fail to utilise efficiently whatever they do 
attract. As IMD Little of Oxford University wrote several years ago, " FDI is as 
good or as bad as your policies"  
 None of this is to say that multinationals are entirely blameless in all that they 
do. Admittedly wage rates paid by multinationals in certain areas of activity in 
some of the developing countries are abysmally low. Indeed, they do seek low 
wage locations for many of their processing activities.  But why do multinationals 
get away with paying abysmally low wages in certain countries but not in others?  
Here again it is the failure of policy, or the absence of it, which allows profit 
maximising multinationals to take advantage of low wage labour.  Countries 
which have failed to institute trade and investment policies designed to create 
jobs and employment opportunities are also the ones which seek low wage jobs 
from multinationals.  If the opportunity cost of labour is negligible in these 
countries, it is the overall framework of economic policy which is to be blamed.  
There is little point in railing against multinationals for seeking low wage 
locations. It is wishful thinking to expect profit maximising firms to behave as 
social service agencies, especially so when the domestic market environment is 
riddled with distortions.  Low wage locations, such as the Export Processing 
Zones in some of these countries, for example, are no more than a feeble 
attempt at offsetting distortions elsewhere in the economy.  
     All this is familiar landscape dating back to the seventies. The concern now is 
with the efficient utilisation of FDI in the promotion of national economic 
objectives whilst at the same time preserving economic sovereignty cherished by nation states. What is the nature of the threat to their sovereignty from the 
operations of foreign firms that developing countries perceive? This perception of 
loss of economic sovereignty differs between various influential groups in the 
host countries. The late Raymond Vernon identified three influential groups: the 
government bureaucrats, the local businessmen and the elite.  The bureaucrats 
perceive a threat to their power and control over the local economy from the 
operations of foreign firms.  As Vernon put it  " the indigenous bureaucrats are 
torn between two powerful needs. At times, they have felt the need to safeguard 
the companies from the untenable demands of their colleagues, in order not to 
kill the egg-laying goose; at other times, they have felt the need to take a leading 
role in extracting added benefits from the companies in order to strengthen their 
claim to continued power " (1994). The stance of the local businessmen has 
changed over time.  With the growth in their ability to compete with foreign firms 
they have attempted to cut back the scope of foreign firms. Those businessmen 
whose activities complement that of the foreign firms though seem to tolerate the 
presence of foreign firms if not actively encourage their growth.  The elite is a 
complex group, consisting of those who are opposed to any form of private 
enterprise be it foreign or domestic, those who wish to delimit dependence on 
foreign firms, and those who see foreign firms as a part of the Establishment and 
the threat it poses to their power and influence.  The game plan of the 
bureaucrats for the most part is to voice their concern and opposition to foreign 
firms in public fora, but in private negotiations with foreign firms recognise their 
contribution to development objectives and seek ways and means of attracting 
FDI. Businessmen, in general, lobby for stringent regulation of foreign firms 
where they perceive them as a threat, and where they see them as an aid to their 
power and profits, they seek joint ventures and other avenues of rent sharing. 
The elite does what they are good at - position themselves as critics of foreign 
firms in the media and provide intellectual support to activists such as some of 
the NGOs. 
    The attitude and perceptions of the bureaucrats and local businessmen in 
general towards foreign firms are not entirely unreasonable. At the heart of the 
matter is the control over operations that multinationals exercise.  Economic 
sovereignty is all about delimiting the control over operations or power over 
decision making which foreign firms exercise. The name of the game is to extract 
the maximum possible gains from the operations of foreign firms without killing 
the goose, which lays the egg. And if the goose does threaten their interests, it is 
natural to attempt to circumscribe its sphere of activity.  Control over operations 
is one of the essential features of FDI.  It is this aspect of FDI which theories of 
the multinational enterprise style as the ability of the firm to internalise operations 
or by pass the market.  And it is internalisation, which enables the enterprise to 
preserve and exploit the so-called ownership advantages it possesses. It is again 
the ability to internalise and exercise control over operations, which enables the 
multinational enterprise to efficiently transfer technology and know how across 
borders. But it is internalisation, which creates tensions between the multinational 
enterprises and host countries. Internalisation or the exercise of control over 
operations and ownership of production facilities by foreign firms is perceived as 
a threat to their sovereignty by the developing countries. In other words, they 
face a trade off between increased gains from FDI to the host economy and loss 
of economic sovereignty, as they perceive it.  But any dilution of control over 
operations limits the efficiency of operations of foreign firms.  The higher the 
degree of control they cede to local interests, by conforming to the rules and 
regulations imposed on them, less is their ability to transfer technology and know 
how to the local economy.  Here the trade off the foreign firms face is between 
the loss of control over operations and efficient operations.  Multilateral rules 
governing FDI should assist in arriving at a compromise and resolving the 
dilemma both groups face.  
 The problem though arises when the interests of the bureaucrats and the 
businessmen do not coincide with national objectives. In other words ,if they are 
intent on safeguarding their private profits and their power base at the expense of 
the social good which foreign firms , given the appropriate climate, are capable of promoting , they play into the hands of ideologues and the elite. And their actions 
and the policies they advocate and institute may do more harm than good.  It is 
this group of businessmen and bureaucrats who see a threat to their power and 
profits from foreign firms who play the sovereignty card for all it is worth.   
 The thesis that FDI involves issues of sovereignty and therefore nothing should 
be done, or whatever is done must be gradual, or that the time is not ripe for 
dealing with the issue, fails to identify the specific problem, which should be 
addressed.  It is that  entrenched  interest groups invoke sovereignty as an 
excuse to preserve and perpetuate their interests. In the name of sovereignty 
they institute rules and regulations which impair efficient operations of foreign 
firms and delimit their contribution to the social product. The challenge is to 
identify and eschew policies designed only to promote the narrow self interest of 
these groups, and devise rules and regulations which promote efficient 
operations of foreign firms, which in turn bestows on the host economy the 
maximum possible gains from their operations. What of the elite and their 
perceptions?  They have to be accepted as a fact of life, at best they may serve 
the purpose of engineering a reasoned debate and at worst continue to muddy 
the waters . The issue of sovereignty as interpreted here is one, which will not 
disappear with time, it is an inescapable fact which is likely to grow in complexity 
with the growth of globalisation.  But if  one were to shy away from formulating a 
compact on FDI, because it involves issues of sovereignty, it would only serve to 
strengthen the hands of the ideologues and weaken  the efforts of those who 
wish to utilise FDI efficiently in the promotion of development objectives. 
 
III A Framework of Multilateral Rules for FDI 
  
The task of devising on FDI under the aegis of the WTO is  much more complex 
than devising multilateral rules on trade, for  reasons stated earlier. Even so, the 
gains from such a compact are likely to be substantial for both the recipients and 
providers of FDI. The problem  is that any suggestion of such a compact is 
immediately seen as one sided, a set of rules designed to pave the way for unrestrained flows of capital from the developed to developing countries. The 
framework of rules should recognise the concerns of developing countries, 
principally the dilemma they face, discussed earlier, and shift the emphasis away 
from the objective of easing the passage for multinational firms. 
 
Before discussing  the form and nature of the compact, which is likely to be 
acceptable to the recipients of FDI, especially the developing countries, several 
objections to its inclusion on the WTO agenda require discussion. First of these 
is that the WTO is not the appropriate fora for framing a compact on FDI as its 
mandate does not extend to investment, it is confined to trade.  This was also 
one of the objections to the inclusion of services on the agenda of the WTO. This 
has no basis in fact, simply because a substantial proportion of world trade is on 
account of the multinationals. In the year 1999 exports of foreign affiliates of 
multinationals accounted for more than 45 percent total world exports of around 
$7 trillion.  If rules can be devised for trade, there is no reason why they should 
not be extended to the entities, which generate trade. The latter is unlikely to 
flourish in the absence of the former.  It is now an established fact that trade and 
FDI are complements for one another and not substitutes. A set of rules which 
facilitate both the flows of FDI and its efficient operations is more than likely to 
promote the growth of trade. 
  In any case, services are on the agenda of the WTO, and save in the case of 
the so called long distance services, efficient delivery of most services require 
the presence of the producer in the locale of the consumer.  Here production and 
trade are coterminous.  More often than not the presence of the service producer 
in the locale of the consumer is established through FDI.  Again, TRIMS, which 
are on the agenda of the WTO, are all about the polices of host countries 
towards foreign firms. They impact on production decisions of foreign firms 
including sourcing of inputs. Admittedly, the justification for the inclusion of 
TRIMS in the WTO is that all such measures at one remove or the other impact 
upon trade. But then there are very few policy measures , which do not impact 
upon trade in one way or the other.  There is no escaping the fact that FDI in one form or the other is already on the agenda of the WTO, but the regulations 
relating to it are haphazard and scattered through out  various agreements 
relating to services, TRIMS, subsidies and government procurement. 
  What can a compact on FDI achieve?  As argued earlier, the twin objectives of 
the compact should be to (a) provide access to FDI for developing countries, 
which receive relatively low volumes of FDI, and (b), help resolve the economic 
sovereignty dilemma the developing countries face in utilising FDI.  First of these 
requires not only increased volumes of  FDI in toto, but also a much more 
widespread distribution of FDI than that prevails now.  Both of these objectives, 
especially the second one , essentially involves creating competitive market 
conditions, which foster efficient operations of foreign firms .  
    The first of these objectives poses much more of a challenge than the second. 
The literature on the determinants of FDI identifies macro economic stability 
including exchange rate stability, distortion free product and labour markets 
which allow for the play of comparative advantage in resource allocation, a stable 
policy frame work on FDI, and resource endowments including a threshold level 
of human capital as the main determinants of FDI. No compact  on FDI, however 
ingenious it may be, can promote macro economic stability or the provision of 
human capital. These belong to domestic policy in the host countries.  A compact 
on FDI, however, may serve to promote the establishment of a stable policy 
framework and the elimination of distortions in product and labour markets. There 
is a strong suggestion in the literature that when foreign firms seek political 
stability, what they look for is stability of policies . In fact, economic stability may 
more often than not promote political stability.  Here the enshrined principles of 
the WTO relating to trade- MFN, transparency and national treatment may serve 
to promote stability of policies. Non- discrimination between differing providers of 
FDI , explicit regulations which are agreed upon and bound and  the guarantee 
that  there would be no discrimination in the policy frame work between foreign 
owned firms and locally owned firms should achieve  policy stability which foreign 
firms seek.      Some of these factors relating to determinants also influence efficient 
utilisation of FDI, which in turn are intimately related to the economic sovereignty 
issue discussed earlier.  First of these is the presence of distortion free markets 
defined as markets where prices of factors of production and products reflect 
social opportunity costs.  In most developing countries , especially those that 
receive relatively low volumes of FDI at present, factor and product market 
distortions are pervasive. These arise from tariffs and quotas on trade, stringent 
labour laws designed to protect jobs or more specifically appease labour unions, 
as in the case of India, and assorted subsidies including export subsidies. It is 
now the received wisdom that such distortions do not attract large volumes of 
FDI, and that which is attracted, such as the tariff jumping type of FDI, serves to 
bolster rents and the private returns to foreign investments, and they also impair 
efficiency of operations.   
     What can a set of multilateral rules achieve to reduce if not eliminate these 
distortions?  To the extent agreed upon rules pertaining to trade serve to lower 
artificial barriers to trade, they also serve to reduce product market distortions. 
Especially  relevant  in the context of FDI  are Trade Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMS) which encompass not only regulations such as local content 
requirements (LCRs) equity regulations tied to exports, and so called incentives 
such as tax holidays, tax concessions and assorted subsidies.  The economic 
sovereignty issue is also bound up with TRIMS.  This complex beast is supposed 
to serve several objectives - garner the maximum possible benefits from the 
operations of foreign firms to the host countries, satiate the desire of bureaucrats 
to retain power and control, provide local businessmen a complementary role in 
the operations of foreign firms and in some cases protect them from foreign 
competition. In other words, these measures ostensibly allow host countries to 
exercise economic sovereignty over the operations of foreign firms.  In some 
cases ,TRIMS are also designed to offset policy-induced distortions elsewhere in 
the economy.  Export subsidies and equity regulations tied to exports are an 
attempt to offset the attractions of a protected domestic market, so too are the 
export processing zones pervasive in developing countries.    TRIMS  were included on the agenda of the Uruguay Round on the grounds 
that they had an impact on trade. The Uruguay Round accord on TRIMS relates 
to local content requirements ( LCRs) and incentives such as tax concessions, 
which are tied to exports.  Both of these regulations not only violate the principle 
of national treatment but also  Article XI of the WTO relating to  prohibition of 
QRs. The accord requires member countries to phase out TRIMS, which violate 
the principles of national treatment and prohibition of QRS.  
  The agreement on TRIMS in the Uruguay round though amounts  to no more 
than a Pyrrhic victory. It addresses only the LCRs and  export obligations. It has 
nothing to say about several other TRIMS such as the various sorts of subsidies 
and tax incentives the host countries offer foreign firms, nor does it include 
regulations relating to employment of nationals, and  the requirement of some 
developing countries that foreign enterprise participation has to be in the form of 
joint-ventures with locally owned firms.  The agreement is much weaker than that 
concluded in the NAFTA agreement. Even so, the fact an agreement of sorts was 
arrived at in the Uruguay round negotiations is a major achievement.  How best 
to build on that which has been achieved?  A multilateral framework on FDI 
would inevitably  reopen the issue of TRIMS . The developing countries would 
seek ways and means of preserving their economic sovereignty, as discussed 
above, and are unlikely to consent to a blanket  ban on all TRIMS.  But then any 
suggestion that each and every TRIM should  be assessed for its trade distorting 
effects, as was proposed by the developing countries on the run up to the 
Uruguay round, would only serve to muddy the waters.  The so-called case by 
case approach, so dear to the hearts of bureaucrats, would only result in 
protracted negotiations, delay and red tape.  
    The alternative would be to formulate general rules designed to preserve those 
aspects of TRIMS, which do promote the development objectives of developing 
countries.  Instead of imposing  a ban on all LCRs, developing countries could be 
allowed to require foreign firms to gradually increase their purchases of locally 
produced components over time. This would allow foreign firms  time to search 
for indigenous suppliers and impart the technology required to such suppliers. In any case, most multinationals would seek indigenous sources of supply of 
components  rather than incur heavy transport costs which imports would 
involve, especially so if the former are cost competitive.  The problem they face 
though is the heavy search costs of locating competent  local suppliers . LCRS 
would act as a catalyst  for the search process ( Balasubramanyam ,1990). 
Faced with LCRs in several of the host countries, Japanese firms have  
established  competent suppliers of components in the automobile industry. The 
model they have adopted in India, in the case of the Maruthi car project , 
provides a good example of  how TRIMS can serve development objectives. The 
Japanese firm contracts out supply of components to local suppliers, provides 
them with the blue prints and required know-how, and  stipulates that the price 
paid for the components would be reduced over a specified time period to that 
prevailing in international markets.  This scheme nourishes the infant suppliers 
with all that they need to grow up, but if they fail to do so within a reasonable 
period of time they are allowed to die.  
 This scheme is similar to the one in operation, which allows developing countries 
five years, and the least developed countries seven years to dismantle TRIMS in 
toto.  Instead of the proviso that all TRIMS should be dismantled, it suggests that  
TRIMS which are geared to promote development objectives should be allowed 
but with a time constraint.  
      TRIMS such as those which tie equity participation to exports, though, are 
much more problematic. These are imposed for narrow balance of payments 
reasons and not for  broader development objectives.  In the presence of 
distortion free markets comparative advantage and market forces would guide 
the  investment allocations of foreign firms. Equity oriented export requirements 
are put in place to offset distortions elsewhere in the economy, which provide 
artificial incentives for production oriented towards domestic markets.  These 
restrictions hardly fulfil development objectives . A foreign firm, which does not 
wish to comply with  equity restrictions, may dilute its equity in favour of 
indigenous suppliers and opt to  produce for the protected domestic market.  And 
indigenous capital, whose social opportunity costs could be considerable , will also be  oriented towards the protected domestic market. The net result is the 
creation of rents in a protected markets for both the foreign owned and 
domestically owned firms. And it would also result in a reduction in trade. There 
are also instances where foreign owned firms are allowed 100 percent ownership 
of equity if their entire output is exported.  Suppose that export prices are lower 
than that prevailing in domestic markets and the foreign firm services both 
markets. In this case the foreign firm operating in the protected domestic market 
would have an incentive to bridge the price difference between the two markets 
by raising prices on the domestic market. In essence domestic consumers would  
provide an export subsidy to the foreign firm. All this and other distortions and 
social costs these measures impose have been rehearsed often (Greenaway, 
1991 ) These are not measures  that promote development objectives and have 
no place in a compact on FDI. 
     Then there is an assorted set of incentives offered by developing countries to 
attract FDI. These include tax holidays , tax concessions and subsidies of various 
sorts. Most of these incentives are tied to performance requirements of one sort 
or the other.  It is doubtful if these incentives do weigh heavily in the investment 
decision process of foreign firms. The evidence on the issue is not conclusive. 
Developing countries may be compelled to offer such incentives only because 
their competitors for FDI offer them. If none of the countries offer such incentives 
the location decision of FDI would be based on the  resource endowments of 
host countries , and the climate for efficient  operations they provide. Given the 
nature of these incentives,   and the fact that each of the host countries offer 
such incentives only because others do so, it is likely that they are yet another 
source of distortions in the market for FDI. It would be in the interests of 
developing countries to do way with such incentives which only serve to transfer 
incomes to foreign firms.  At the very least they should consent to a set of WTO 
rules which would limit the distortions incentives generate and eliminate 
competition between developing countries based on artificial incentives.  
  Although LCRs, equity and export regulations, and incentives are frequently 
seen as instruments devised to transfer rents from the multinationals to host countries, they often extend into other areas such as competition policy.  
Regulations which limit operations of foreign firms to designated regions and 
areas of host countries, prohibit them from entering designated areas of 
economic activity and stipulate conditions governing joint-ventures , acquisitions 
and mergers all fall into the arena of competition policy.  These policies go 
beyond the  objective of transferring rents from multinationals to host countries . 
Here the objective is preservation of economic sovereignty or the retention of 
national control over production facilities.  
 
 This is the principal issue which policy makers are reluctant to discuss and 
opponents of globalisation make much of.  Admittedly debate on these issues 
cannot be confined to narrow economic considerations such as their impact on 
resource allocation and economic efficiency of operations of  FDI.   The concerns 
of the developing countries have to be heard and rules and regulations devised 
with a view to preserving the economic sovereignty of developing countries.  
Whilst exceptions to the general principles of national treatment may  have to be 
conceded ,  there is no reason  why such policies should not be subjected to 
rules relating to transparency and stability of policy regimes.  In developed 
countries such as the UK there are tried and tested procedures for the 
adjudication of disputes concerning  mergers and acquisitions  including cross 
border mergers and acquisitions. Cases referred to the Competition Commission 
in the UK are adjudicated on the basis of the impact of mergers on consumer 
interests and lately on whether or not they interfere with competition in the 
market place. Admittedly when the concern of the policy makers is not so much 
with consumer interests or impact on competition, but with loss of control 
exercised by national governments over the operations of foreign firms the 
problem is much more complex.  In such cases, exceptions to the general 
framework of rules governing FDI have to be allowed, albeit in the knowledge 
that host countries may be sacrificing economic objectives for the sake of non-
economic objectives.  It is though worth noting that much of FDI flows to 
developing countries are for green-field investments , cross border  mergers and acquisitions are, as yet,  very much a developed country phenomenon.  Mergers 
and acquisitions of locally owned firms by foreign firms account for around  one-
third of all FDI flows to developing countries, and these are mostly  in East Asia 
and the Latin American countries.  Developing countries such as Malaysia  and  
Korea do have guidelines on mergers and acquisitions, some of these read very 
much like LCRs. It is worth considering whether or not a generalised framework 
of regulations on mergers and acquisitions, as opposed to individual country 
regulations, would be much more effective in promoting both increased flows of 
FDI to developing countries and its  efficient utilisation. 
 
It is worth noting in this context that the GATS accord in the WTO, which is 
essentially an agreement relating to FDI, as services necessarily entail presence 
and establishment, provides a framework for a multilateral agreement on FDI.  
The GATS takes account of many of the concerns of developing countries  whist 
at the same time subjecting trade in services to MFN, national treatment, market 
access and transparency.  Perhaps , the next step would be to extend GATS to 
cover FDI in other areas. In the past suggestions for a  separate agreement on 
FDI have been made. It may though be judicious to  aim at one cohesive set of 
rules and regulations on FDI  which would encompass the GATS accord. The 
new set of rules to be incorporated would include TRIMS and other national 
regulations relating to FDI discussed earlier.  It would be neither necessary nor  
practical to establish a separate code of rules  for FDI when one already exists in 
the form of GATS. 
  
 Conclusion 
 This brief paper has argued the case for an agreement on FDI  in the WTO.  It 
rejects the argument that the WTO is not the forum for such an agreement, on 
the grounds that FDI is very much a part of the WTO , it already exists in the form 
of agreements on TRIPS and TRIMS and trade in services. Furthermore much of 
international trade which the WTO oversees is generated by FDI.  It would make 
little sense to deny that which already exists in the WTO.  But that which exists  is patchy and haphazard.  The various agreements do no more than tinker at the 
edges of the problem. A cohesive compact which incorporates TRIMS and GATS 
under one umbrella should be much more efficient and manageable than that 
which exists. 
 
The argument that FDI is doing well  by market forces cannot be sustained. It 
may be doing well in terms of the steady growth in the volume of FDI , but it is 
unevenly distributed amongst the developing countries and there is no reason to 
believe that it contributes to development objectives everywhere and anywhere.  
It has the potential to be a major force in development, it is an excellent catalyst 
of growth and perhaps the one and only tested and tried conduit for the transfer 
of technology and know-how.  But it falls far short of its potential for reasons 
outlined in the paper. A compact on FDI under the aegis of the WTO should  
create the necessary investment climate for FDI to fulfil its potential.  The 
argument that FDI involves issues of sovereignty and therefore a multilateral 
framework should not be discussed or that the time do so is not yet ripe does not 
also hold water. Any sort of international commerce involves issues of 
sovereignty. It is unavoidable and the time will  never be ripe, the ostrich can't 
bury its head in the sand forever. The issue has to be met head on. The paper 
has  argued that economic sovereignty can be interpreted in many ways and 
there is more than one group in developing countries for whom the issue is of 
interest.  The challenge the developing countries face is one of a trade off 
between  economic sovereignty and the fruits that FDI yields.  A compact on FDI 
on the lines suggested in the paper should help resolve this trade off to a large 
extent.  
    Finally and most importantly any attempts at forging a compact on FDI based 
on the thesis that it would facilitate increased flows of FDI and protect the 
interests of multinationals are unlikely to succeed. The agreement or the 
argument for an agreement has to be couched in terms which reflect developing 
country interests, recognises the trade off between sovereignty and gains from 
FDI they face, and emphasises the potential of FDI for development.  A blanket ban on TRIMS will not be acceptable to developing countries nor should a 
discussion on TRIMS be confined to those TRIMS which impact on trade. The 
discussion has to be centred on the role of TRIMS in promoting development 
objectives including rent transfers to developing countries from the foreign firms. 
Any of the TRIMS which do not satisfy this criteria, irrespective of their trade 
effects, have to be abolished.  In any case, with the growth in the liberalisation of 
international trade the rationale for TRIMS will fade. Most TRIMS are in existence 
to counter factor and product market distortions caused by trade policy in 
developing countries. The compact on FDI should explicitly recognise the 
interdependence between trade and FDI and this is the most powerful rationale 
for a compact on FDI under the WTO. No doubt an attempt at forging multilateral 
rules on FDI will extend the remit of the WTO beyond its traditional role as the 
guardian of fair trade or rules based trade, but such is the nature of the beast that 
a wider role for the WTO has to be accepted. 
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